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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
PRLTDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN A8SOCIA'TION, a corpora-
tion, 
Plaintiff a1nd Rrspondcnt, 
-vs.-
'l1HE ST. PAUL INSURANCE COM-
PANIE8, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
FlR811 Al\lERICAN TITLE INSUR-
ANCE AND TRUST COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
107G5 
REPLY BRIEF OF PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION 
PrndPntial Ft!d(•ral Savings & Loan Association has 
fil<·d this action for a df'claratory judgment n~garding the 
l'i<ldity bonJ issut>d to it by Appellant, and the District 
Court has entPrC>d such decalartory judgment interpret-
ing tlt<• t<•rms thNeof. Respondent (hereinafter referred 
t1J ns ''Prudential") asks for affirmance of such judg-
Ii Ii'] It. 
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StTATE,MENT OF FACTS 
We feel that the statenwn t of facts submitted by 
appellant omits basic factual matters as related to the 
positon of Prudential n this proceeding. ThPS(~ facts are 
set forth as follows: 
On or about June 30, 19GO, appellant issued its 
fidelity bond, No·. 404-F09886-B, with $1,000,000.00 cov-
erage on all of Prudential's employees. Delmer D. Row-
ley was tht>n such an employee, and during 1962 to 196(i 
was one of it:,, Loan Offict>rs charg<>d with closing loans 
for Prudential. No dispute exists as to the fact of the 
employment of Delmar D. Rowley during the effective 
period of the fidelity bond, and that the said fidelity 
bond was before the court (Exh. P-1) though not intro~ 
duced actually in evidence by stipulation until after tlw 
order was made by the court. 
It was discovered in 1965 that said Rowley ha<l 
apparently embezzled or wrongfully applied the pro-
ceeds of four different loans which he had handled as 
Loan Officer for his employer, Prudential, in the follmr-
ing amounts: $14,900.00 in December, 19G2; $17 ,S-±5.20 
in October, 1963; $14,389.57 in Decembt>r, 19Ci4; $17, -1-37.-
75 in March of 19G-t-. If e was chargt'd with su<"h eri11w 
in the Unitt>d Statt>s District Court, District of lTtah, in 
Case No. CR 66-65, Unit rd States of A111crira v. Del111l'r 
D. R011.'lry, and aftPr a plPa of ''not g·uilt,\''' \Ya~ f'onuil 
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µ;nilty by a jury of violating Section 657, Title 18, United 
Slates Code Annotat0d, as charged on all four counts, and 
on July :2G, 19G5, he was s0ntenced to be imprisoned in 
pursuance of such and :omhsequently was imprisoned and 
served his s0ntence for 0rnlwzzlPnwnt. 
The def 0ndant St. Paul Insurance Companies paid 
to PrudPntial the amotmt of the embezzlements on the 
last thre0 items noted above, but has refused to pay the 
first mw, being the so-called "Parker Loan." Demand 
for tlw payment of the said four losses under the terms 
of tltP policy was made at tlw same time, and St. Paul 
has assr>rted that it has a dc~fonse to the payment of the 
fourth one, namely the Parker Loan embezzlement, on the 
grounds of "otlL<T indernnit~v," or "other insurance" pro-
Yision:-; of itf; policy. 
The> indPnmity bond was idfmtified in the complaint 
by s1wcific number, and hence no uncertainty existed 
in th<c• mind of the defendant St. Paul as to the nature 
of it, and it hy its answPr duly admitted that for valuable 
eo.nsidPration r<'ePiwd it lmd issued to the plaintiff its 
~aid policy as idPntifil~d, ·which provides tlw ind0mnifica-
tion sd forth therein. rrhP said policy is specific in its 
t\•nns and conditions, and particularly paragraph I of 
tlw insuring- clamws providPs: 
( A) l. "Any lo:,;s by reason of any dishonest, 
f"ramlnlent or rriminal act of any emvloyee as 
ltPrPtofore ddinc'd, or of any director or tnrntee 
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of the insured while performing acts coming with-
in the scope of the usual duties of an 0mployee, 
including loss o.f property by reason of any su0h 
act of any such employee, and also including the 
dishonest issue of stock, share or investment cer-
tificates by any such employee, whether acting 
alone or in collusion with others.n 
The ma.~imum amount of su0h coverage is $1,000,000.00. 
The fidelity bond policy contains the exclusion clause 
which is at issue in this declaratory judgment, namely: 
"OTHER INSFRANiCE.-If the insured holds 
other valid or collectible indemnity against any 
loss, covered hereunder, tht~ Undt>rwriter shall lw 
liable hereunder only for such amount of such los:> 
as is in excss of the amount of such oth('I' indemn-
ity, not exceeding the amount of coveragP here-
undPr." 
First American, through its local title insurance 
agent, Security Title Company, had issued and delivered 
to Prudential its preliminary report on the Parker loan 
transaction on December 21, 1962. 'Phe embezzlement by 
Rowley was on December 26, 1962. A policy of title 
insurance was issued to Prudential in August, 196.1, which 
omitted the First Federal prior mortgage (duly shown 
in the preliminary report) though in fad thr Fir:o;t 
Federal mortgage had not b('rn paid and 'ms st ill a first 
lien ahead of the Parker mortgage. It is this policy 
of title insurance, issued Pight months aft<•r l\lr. H<m-
h•y's wrongful taking of the mortgage loan funds, which 
~t. Paul ('laims is ''otlwr insurance" or "other indemn-
ity." 
In the nwantinw, the ddendant St. Paul had brought 
lwfon~ the court on its motion the defrndant First Ameri-
can. 1 t is to he not Pd hat no counterclaim or cross-claim 
11 as filed h.'T the dPfrndant St. Paul against First Ameri-
('ttn, and hence the court ~was hound to make its determina-
tion prPClicated upon the complaint itself, which was 
solel)T for declaratory judgment as to the interpretation 
of the language of the fidelity bond, the prayt>r ending: 
"\VlterPfore plaintiff prays that the court 
mah a dPclarator.'T judgmmt as to the liability 
of defendant in this matter to it under the terms 
of its po lie)'; and interpret the policy and issue 
.indg1:1Pnt stating \\'lwther or not the said defend-
ant is excused from its liability by reason of tlw 
existence of the :-;aid policy of title insurance 
\Yhieh \\"as issn<'cl in Angust, 1%3, though the 
rnorn·:T '''as appropriafrd in Decemher of l 9G2.'' 
'!'lie J)istrid Co1ut consi<ll·red thP matters lwfore it on 
~lotion for Srn1mmr~T .Judgin<'nt (H. 27 and 30) and Affi-
da,·it (R. i33), l\l<·1110rnndnm (H. -Hi), and statements of 
er'lllls(•l, and mad<> its Findings of Fad and Summary 
.J udgrn<•nt in ptusmUH'<' of' the prn.n•rs for declaratory 
11Hl'..2,·111<'nt as to th<• int<·rp1·etation of tlw tr•rms of tl1r• 
;: 111 l 11 ind. 
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The contents of the Affidavit of Mr. Hayden M. 
Calvert, Vice-President of Prudential (R 33-36) do not 
appear to be controverted and hence such are adopted 
'vithout restatement here. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACTION WAS FOR DECLARATORY JUDG-
MENT AND THE COURT FAIRLY MET THE ISSUE 
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE LAN-
GUAGE OF THE DOCUMENTS TO BE INTER-
PRETED AND THE RESPONSE OF THE PARTIES. 
TO THE PLEADINGS IN THE PROCEEDING. 
POINT II 
TH RULES OF THE COURT WERE FOLLOWED 
IN THE PRESENTATION OF THE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND THE DEFENDANTS 
WERE AFFORDED FULL OPPORTUNITY TO PRE-
SENT THEIR POSITION BEFORE THE COURT 
PRIOR TO THE RENDITION OF JUDGMENT. 
As this is a procedure for dt'claratory judgment, it 
seems appropriate to refresh our minds as to the juris-
diction in these matters. Section 78-33-1 lJ.C.A. 195:3 
reads: 
7 
".Jurisdiction of district courts - Form -
Effrct. - 'L'lw district courts within their respec-
tive jurisdictions shall have po\wr to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations, whether 
or not further reliPf is or could be claimed. No ac-
tion or proceeding shall be open to objection on the 
ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is 
pray(~d for. '11 he declamtion may be either affirm-
ative or negative in form and effect; and such 
drclarations shall have the force and effect of a 
final judgment or decree." 
~(~etion 78-33-2 U.C.A. 1!153 reads: 
"Rights, status, legal relations under instru-
ltJPnts or statute ma.\· be determined. - Any per-
son interested under a deed, will or written 
contraet, or whose rights, status or other ll'gal 
relations an• aff<::~rted by a statutl', municipal or-
dinanrP, eontract or franchise, may have deter-
mined an)· qrn•stion of construction or validity 
arising under tlw instrument, statute, ordinance, 
contract or franchise and obtain a dt>-claration of 
rights, status or other legal relations tlwrt'under. 
Tlw statntPs and eases make it clear that the Court 
:-:hall constnw contracts, (•ithPr before or after breach 
and tliPn~h.\· eliminate any uncertainties which exist. All 
parti('S having a din•ct interest in the contract or issue 
ma.\· lw joirn•d and the <lPkrmination made by the Court 
i:-; binding. 8f'ction 78-33-12 U.C.A. 1953 deelarPs this 
<"11aptr>r to lw "n'!ll(•dial" tn settle uncertainty an<l in-
:--1•1·t1rity with l'P:Slllod to rights and lPg-al relations "and 
1 111 lw l1h('rallY cmrntnwcl arnl ad111inisten•d. '' 
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Consistent decisions affirm the general purpose of 
the chapter to enable parties to seek and receive answers 
to contractual disputes. The interpretation of the "other 
insurance" or "other indemnity" exclusion clause of the 
$1,000,000.00 fidelity policy issued by St. Paul is a classi-
cal situation for determination by declaratory judgment. 
In Gray v. Defa, 103 U. 339, 135 P.2d 251, this Court held 
that in such an action a counterc1rum could be filed if 
neeessary to seek a final adjudication of rights (here to 
quiet title). This decision refers to the wide jud~cial 
discretion granted to the judge in these declaratory 
judgment procePdings. 
In our pending case we believe it to be significant 
that appellant, St. Paul, has not sought assistance by 
counterclaim or cross-eomplaint. Its Answer (R 5) de-
fends on the "other insurance or indemnity" theory and 
prays only that it have "judgment doolaring it to have 
no liability to plaintiff." The document then contains a 
Motion to bring in First American so that complete 
relief may be accorded. 
Some eomplaint is found in appellant's brief that 
the Affidavit in support of the Motion for Surmnary 
Judgment was filed and served on appellant on July H 
and the argument was on July 18. The Motion had been 
served by plaintiff on July 1 by mail. "\Ve find no offense 
to the Rules by this timing. Accompanying the Affidavit 
on July 14 was a Memorandum In Support of l\fotion 
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for Summary Judgment. Thus counsel was fully advised 
well in advance of the hearing date, not only of the 
1Iotion, the Affidavit, but also of plaintiff's legal argu-
ment as reflected by the :Memorandum. No surprise can 
be claimed. We do not wish to wrestle with a procedural 
interpretation of Rule 56(c) on the need for filing Affi-
davits at least ten days before hearing of the Motion for 
Sununary Judgment. Said subsection merely provides 
that th<-' "motion shall be served at least 10 days before 
the time fixed for the hearing." 
In the Court's discretion, had he felt that any im-
position was being felt by defendants, the matter could 
have bt>en continued. Counsel for St. Paul was permitted 
to make a tender of proof, the matter was argued on its 
merits and the decision rpached. Thereafter Findings 
and Smmnary Judgment were duly served, .July 20, 1966, 
and St. Paul filed its Motion to Amend the Findings and 
.Judgment (R. 63) on August 1, 1966, and then on Septem-
lwr 22, 1966 filed two Affidavits in support of such 
Motion (R. 73-80). These wPre duly argued October 18, 
1966 and the l\Iotion to Anwnd was denied October 19, 
1966. Amplt> consideration was thus afforded to St. Paul 
on its Affidavits and no real prejudice can be asserted 
on the timeliness of the original Affidavit filed by plain-
tiff. 
It is interesting to note that the Affidavit by Mr. 
Calvurt, Vice PrPsidPnt of Prudential, is criticized hy 
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appellant as not being ·within the purvit>w of Rule 5G( c), 
but one of St. Paul's Affidavits is by Mr. Palmer, counsel 
for 8t. Paul. 
vVe belit>Vf' that the discrPtionary powers of tlw 
Court under the declaratory judg1nents act have been 
wisely exercised. No abuse of time requirements has 
existed. Appellant, St. Paul, was afforded ample op-
portunity to make tenders of proof, file affidavits, make 
motions and argue the matter twieP. 'The procedural 
steps taken are ample to satisfy all requirements of du<> 
proct>ss of justiee. 
POINT III 
NO MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT EXISTED, NOT 
COVERED BY THE AFFIDAVITS BEFORE THE 
COURT, WHICH WAS NECESSARY FOR THE DE-
TERMINATION OF THE DECLARATORY JUDG-
MENT PRAYER AND THE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE INDEMNITY BOND BEFORE THE COURT. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE INDEMNITY BOND, AND PROP-
ERLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS NO 
"OTHER INSURANCE" OR "OTHER INDEMNITY" 
SO AS TO EXCLUDE THE LIABILITY FOR THE 
DEFALCATION AND DISHONEST ACTS OF THE 
EMPLOYEE ROWLEY. 
11 
rrl1e real issue is the interpretation of appellant St. 
Paul's own chosen language in its escape clause in the 
indemnity bond. At the inception we call to the Court's 
attention the time-tested rule of strict construction on 
exclusionary provisions of a policy of insurance. This 
fidelity bond must be constrm•d as coverage of the "loss 
hy reason of any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act 
of any employee." Tlw "other insurance" or "other in-
dPmnity" provision is an exception, exclusion or limita-
tion. Liberal construction in favor of the insured is 
enjoin<>d on the Court. In decisions your Court has re-
forred to this as "strictissimi juris." 
Prudential has sought aid from the Court in the 
problem of proper interpretation of this exclusionary 
clause. Four loan proceeds were misapplied by the Loan 
Offir('r, Rowh•y. Claim for all four losses was made upon 
:St. Paul. Three of the losses were paid, hut the Parker 
loan loss was denied because of the "other insurance or 
other indemnity" clause as stated in the Answer. 
Prudential thus finds itself between two insurance 
rompanies. No one denies its loss by reason of the taking 
of Uw funds by Rowley. 1'he jury in the United States 
District Court found him guilty of such and he was im-
prisom•d for the same. rl1he requirement of the fidelity 
bond eoverage, "any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal 
ad of any employee" has lwen met. At the time of the 
taking· of the fonds h~· tlw Loan OfficPr, Rowlf'y, no 
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title insurance was in force or effect. Only a preliminary 
title report was in its files. Some eight months lah'r a 
policy of title insurance was issued. Tlw titlt> cornvany 
says that this was by mistakt>: defrnses an~ asserted that 
thl' knowledge of Rmvley as Loan Officer was knmvledge 
of Prudential. Even St. Paul, in its brief, says that tlH' 
title insurance agent issued the policy by mistake (p. 5). 
After evaluating the problt'lll, Prudimtial elt>cted to 
seek a judicial determination and has by its complaint 
alleged its position that appt'llant Rt. Paul is liable under 
the fidt>lity bond. Prudential dot>s not 1wlieve that the 
policy ('Xclusion gives St. Paul an Pscape from the clear 
terms of the covering, insuring clause. 
The following provisions in the bond in question are 
tlw critical phrases: 
"Otlwr insurancP. 1f the insured holds other valid 
or collectible indemnity against any loss, covered 
hereunder, the Underwriter shall be liable here-
under fo.r such amount of such loss as is in excess 
of such other indemnity not e~weeding the amount 
of coverage lwreunder." 
This exdusion in defendant's policy is not applicahl<> 
unless there is "otht>r valid or collectihl<> imlemnity 
against loss covert>d herPnndt>r. . . ." flneh does not 
e>xcuse defpndant from liability on tlw bond because tlw 
poJicy of titlP insurane<' do<>s not eow'r t1J<> t~-ll<' of los~ 
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or losses indemnified by this fidelity bond and because, 
as will be discussed below, the title policy may be un-
rnforceahle as the title insurer asserts that it was issued 
as a result of mistake of a material fact, and was not 
intmded to cover embezzlement risks which St. Paul 
claims. 
The universal rule is that "other'' insurance, as 
used in defendant's bond, exists only where more than 
ont> policy of insurance covers the same interest, in the 
sanw property, against the same risk, for the same per-
rnn. There is "otlwr insurance'' only where the insured 
undertakes to insure the same thing twice over against 
the same perils. \VhE>rf' one of the above elements is 
missing tlwrP is no double insurance. :29A Am. Jnr. p. 
15:-l, lmmrance Section 9Gl; Couch, Cyclopedia of Insur-
ancP Law, page 8685. 
It is quite obvious that the· two policies of insur-
ancP lwre involved (one a fidelity bond insuring against 
tliP dishont>st acts of an officer, and the other a title 
insuranre policy insuring only the trust deed benefici-
ary's intPr<'st in spl~cific pro1wrty) are completely dis-
similar, and do not insure against the same peril. The 
fidPlit~· policy spt>rifically covt>rs, indeed is directly 
aimPd at, the prt>cise situation here involved; wlwreas, 
tlw policy of titl<> insurance srwcifically excludes from 
<'OY<·rngl' insurance against encumbrances created or suf-
l'(·J·t•d lJ~· the insured or known to tl1t> insun•d and un-
14 
known to the insurer. No one n~asonahly can contend 
tha.t a policy of title insurance covers the peril of defal-
cating officer's fraudulent failure to remove an encurn-
hrance through his personal use of funds. 
The burdPn of proving that there is double insurance 
rests with the insurance company pressing that there is 
an exception to its covPrage. 5 Appleman, p. 1'70, 80c. 
3055. Defendant cannot under any factual situation here 
involved sustain the burden of showing that the two 
policies in question insured the same property against 
the same risk. 
The two types of insurance, fidelity insurance and 
title insurance, represent entirely differPnt breeds of 
coverage. Vv e must consider the definitions set by tlH' 
Utah statutes, which are as follows: 
31-11-8. "'Surety immrance' defined. - Surety 
insurance ... (3 fidelity insurance, which is in-
surance guaranteeing the fidelity of persons hold-
ing po.sitions of public or private trust;'' 
31-11-10. " '·Title insurance' defined. Title insur-
ance is insurance of owners of property or others 
having an interest therein, against loss by en-
cumbrancP, or defoctive titl0s, or adverse clairn 
to title, and services eonn<:et<'<l tlH'l'Pwith." 
Chapter 25 of Title 31 deals sol<'ly with titk, insurancl~ 
and 31-25-14- spells out tllP insuring- powPn; as follow::;: 
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"Insuring powers. - Every domestic title insurer 
may isslw title polici<>s and may also insurP: 
(1) thP identity, due execution and validity 
of any notP or bond SN'UrPd by mortgage; 
(2) the identity, dut> ext>cutio.n, Yalidity and 
1·<·cording of any snch mortgage; 
(:~) tlw identity, dut> execution and validity 
of <'VidPncP of indebtedness issued by this state 
or hy any political subdivision or distriict therein, 
or by any private or public corporation." 
As applied to our prest>nt problem, it becomes ob-
vious that the belated title insurance po.licy is not "otht>r 
insman<'('" as related to the esca11e clause in the de-
fendant's fidelity bond defined as "other valid and col-
lPdiblt> indemnity." :t\aturally the Court will apply tlw 
rnle of striet construction to this escape clausf'. 
Prudt-ntial is faced with the position of First Amer-
ican that the policy of titlt> insurance spPCifically provides 
it "doPs not immrt- against loss or damage by reason of 
... d\'frets, liens, Pncumbrances, adverst> claims against 
thC> tith· as insurt-d or other matters" where such defects, 
lic>ns, encwnbram·ps or advt•rse claims were, among other 
things, 
" ( 1) en•ated, suffon•cl, assmHPd or agreed to 
11\· tl1<> insur\'d daim!r.i!.' loss or damage; 01· 
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''(2) known to the Insured Claimant at thP 
date such insured Claimant acquired an estate or 
interest insun~d by this policy and not known to 
the Company (meaning the title insurance eom 
pany) or not shown by the public records; or 
"(3) result(ed) m no loss to the insun,<1 
rlaimant." 
It is fundamental that a corporation can act and b<~ 
bound onl~r through individuals acting as its officers or 
agents. 19 Arn. J ur. 2d Corporations, Sec. 1079. It i:s 
also a fundamental rule pertaining to agents generally 
that the knowledge of an officer or agPnt will be imputed 
to the corporation. 19 Am .. Jnr. 2d Corporations, Sec. 
1263. In the specific transaction here involved Delmer 
D. Rowley, as Loan Officer and Assistant Secretary, was 
the agent and officer through whom the particular trans-
action was consummated on behalf of Prudential. 
Appellant, St. Paul, has asserted an excPption to this 
gEmeral rule, recognized by some authorities, to the effect 
that where an officer or agent of a corporation or as-
sociation is acting in a transaction in which he is per-
sonally or adversely intt>rested or is engaged in tlw 
perpetration o.f an independmt fraudulent transaction, 
and the knowledge relates to such transaction and it 
\\'ould be to his interest to coneeal it, it would lw un-
reasonable to presunw that thP offieN or agent of the 
corporation \\'Ould (·om1mmicat<> snelt kiw\\·l<'dgr> to tlw 
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rnq)oration, and therPfore, the• knowledge is not im-
pnt<>d. 'l'h(:' wisdom of this (:'Xception, at least where thP 
circumstances involve officers of a corporation through 
whom alone thC' corporation can act, has been doubted, 
~ee Pomeroy, Equity .Jurisprudence, 3 Ed. S(•c. G75. This 
Pxception is not applicable in th(' circumstances here in-
volved, hm111eV('r. For on(' reason, that eXiception applies 
only where a third 1wrson seeks to enforce som(' demand 
against the corporation and has no application when the 
corporation S('eks to enforcP a contract entered into by 
surlt officPr on its behalf. Gordon v. Continrntal Casual-
ly Co., 3119 p. 555, 181 A. 57 4. This is certainly analogous 
to the pr('sent situation where the cmblezzlement was in 
December, 19G2 and the title insurance contrad was pro-
cured in August, 1963, by the same corporate officer. 
It will be noted that the exclusion in the title policy 
sperifically excludes encumbrances "known to the in-
sured claimant at the time such insured claimant acquired 
an estate of inter('st insured by this policy." Prudential 
is faced with the position of First American that the 
enc.umbranc-P here involved was fully known to its trust 
officer and assistant secretary, Delmar D. Rowley. In 
thP case where an officer or agent acts fraudulently, 
(·ven though he acts for himself or a third person and 
ilU\'Pl"sPly to the corporation, if he is the sole represen-
tative of the corporation in the transaction in question, 
lh1· eorporation will, according to the generally prevail-
111:.:. viPw, hC' cha.rged with the knowledge of the officer 
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or agent. 19 Am. Jur. 2d. p. G73, Corporations, Sec. 12G7. 
Fremont Trust Co. v. Noyes, 2+6 Mass. 197, 1+1 N:E~. 9:\ 
(1923). 
Appellant, St. Paul, has maintained fidelity insur-
ance for sevC'ral years against any fraudulent ads on 
behalf of Delmer D. Rowley. Rowley's fraudulent con-
duct occurred before the policy of title insurance was 
mistakenly issued; therefore, the fidelity insurance fully 
covered this defalcation of Rowley. 
Prudential is caught in the position of two insurancP 
companies arguing as to which has the covnage on a 
loss sustained by it, and is of the oyiinion that the title 
policy does not and was not intended to cover the risk 
of "encumbrances" suffered because of the defalcations 
of one of its trust officers. ·when it obtained a bond 
from appellant, St. Paul, and paid a premium, it was 
for the very purpose to cover such risks. The policy of 
title insurance did not insure against this type risk and 
is, therefore, not "other insurance" within the exdusion-
ary clause in defendant's bond. 
Review of the authorities cited by appellant indi-
cate·s that it is casting the whole defense on the theory 
that the fidelity insurance is mert>ly "excpss '' to otlH'l' 
insurance. These citations all sPem to resolve them-
selves into a pattern that "excess'' insurance applies only 
where similar type and charadur policiC's of immrnn<'(' 
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or indemnity exist. As shown above, fidelity insurance 
and titlP insurance are two different breeds of insur-
ance. By statutes, by coverage and by language, each 
has an identity apart from tht> other. 
·we assume that First American will brief and dis-
cuss this more in particular. Prudential had no other 
fidelity insurance to protect against loss from fraudu-
lent or dishonest acts of its own employees. This loss 
was an "inside job." The title insurance policy cover-
ag-e was against extraneous causes of loss. 
CONCLUSION 
Prnd(mtial mges this court to affirm the declaratory 
judgment of the District Court. Due procedural steps 
wsted tlw trial court with jurisdiction and sound dis-
CTt>tionary powers were then exercised in confonnance 
11-ith the Rule on declaratory judgments and the spirit 
of such rule to afford a proper interpretation in the 
eon::;truction of the language of the fidelity insurance 
policy. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HA YES, 
RAMPTON & 'V A'TKISS 
HARRY D. PlJGSLEY 
